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In June 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC) appeals
chamber reversed what had been the court’s most significant verdict: a
2016 conviction of a former Congolese vice-president, Jean-Pierre
Bemba, for crimes committed in the Central African Republic. 1 This
was significant because it was the court’s first conviction for crimes of
sexual and gender-based violence and on the basis of command
responsibility, and because Bemba was among the most senior-ranking
officials to appear for trial at the court. 2
An acquittal needs to be understood as a legitimate outcome to any
justice process, but, in context, the decision touched off alarm bells
about the health of the institution. For one, the appeals chamber
decision came ten years after Bemba was surrendered to the court, and
fifteen years or more after the crimes underlying the case were
committed. 3 For another, given that the prosecution had only ever
brought one core international crimes case arising out of its first Central
*

Elizabeth Evenson is the Associate Director of the International Justice
Program at Human Rights Watch. She holds a B.A. from the University
of Chicago, an M.Phil from the University of Nottingham, and a J.D.
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1.

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, ICC-1/05-01/08 (June 8, 2018).

2.

Géraldine Mattioli-Zeltner, High-Profile ICC Warning to Commanders on
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Mar.
21,
2016),
Rape,
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/03/21/dispatches-high-profile-iccwarning-commanders-rape [https://perma.cc/9DNN-U95R].

3.

Background: Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, INT’L JUSTICE MONITOR,
https://www.ijmonitor.org/jean-pierre-bemba-gombo-background/
[https://perma.cc/P6RS-YZNP].
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African Republic investigation, the acquittal left the court utterly
empty-handed when it came to delivering on victims’ expectations for
redress. 4 In addition, beyond the majority opinion, there were two
separate concurring opinions and a dissent; some observed this could
make it difficult to discern key holdings in the future. 5 A statement by
the ICC president appeared to chastise the prosecution’s post-judgment
statement, in which she expressed concern about aspects of the majority
decision. 6
The acquittal also attracted attention given the court’s slim record.
By that June, fifteen years after starting operations, there had been
convictions in only three other cases for core international crimes and
an acquittal in one. 7 Judges had discontinued proceedings, or the
prosecution had dropped charges for lack of evidence, in just as many
cases. 8
4.

Elise Keppler, No Redress for Central African Victims, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 11, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/11/noredress-central-african-victims [https://perma.cc/94ZG-5TVU].

5.

See Joseph Powderly and Niamh Hayes, The Bemba Appeal: A
Fragmented Appeals Chamber Destabilizes the Law and Practice of the
ICC, PHD STUDIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS (June 26, 2018),
http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2018/06/the-bemba-appealfragmented-appeals.html
[https://perma.cc/9N29-7KW6];
Douglas
Guilfoyle, Part II-This is Not Fine: The International Criminal Court in
Trouble, EJIL: Tᴀʟᴋ! (Mar. 22, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/part-iithis-is-not-fine-the-international-criminal-court-in-trouble/#more-17006
[https://perma.cc/Q8FP-SN57].

6.

See Press Release, ICC, Statement of the President of the Court in
relation to the case of Mr Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (June 14, 2018),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180614-pres-stat
[https://perma.cc/5337-LYBP].

7.

As of June 2018, the prosecution had secured convictions in cases against
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Germain Katanga, and Ahmad Al Faqi Al
Mahdi. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgement (Dec.
1, 2014); Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement pursuant
to article 74 of the Statute (Mar. 7, 2014); Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, ICC01/12-01/15, Judgement and Sentence (Sept. 27, 2016). Mathieu
Ngudjolo Chui was acquitted. Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, ICC-01/04-02/12
A, Judgement (Apr. 7, 2015). A trial chamber has since convicted Bosco
Ntaganda on all 18 counts of crimes against humanity brought by the
prosecutor. See ICC: Congo Warlord Guilty of Crimes Against Humanity,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(July
8,
2019),
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/08/icc-congo-warlord-guilty-crimesagainst-humanity [https://perma.cc/CL5A-B33C].

8.

Pre-trial chambers did not confirm cases in one case each arising out of
the Darfur, Sudan and Democratic Republic of the Congo situations. See
CRIMINAL
CT.,
https://www.iccClosed
Stage,
INT’L
cpi.int/Pages/closed.aspx [https://perma.cc/GXA4-NYM9] (explaining
how an ICC case closes and listing cases that are in the closed stage). In
one Kenya case, the pre-trial chamber did not confirm charges against
one defendant, while a trial chamber, by a majority, subsequently vacated
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Terminated cases included those against the president and deputy
president of Kenya, proceedings their administration doggedly sought
to undermine by any means necessary. The administration successfully
capitalized on opposition to the court from some African leaders, as
well as the court’s exclusive focus on investigations on the continent up
to that point, throwing up a specter of mass withdrawal of African
states parties from the treaty. 9 While a mass withdrawal failed to
materialize, it created a political and diplomatic distraction for ICC
member states (one that still lingers in state party discussions), at a
time when states should have been heavily engaged in building practical
and political support for the court as a new institution. 10 After all, the
court’s record is also a product of state failure to assist in the arrest of
more than a dozen ICC fugitives. 11
The Bemba appeals decision dropped like another stone onto a pile
of concerns about the ICC. It was a pile that was still holding, but as
more and more pieces began to drop in the following months—
culminating in the decision of an ICC pre-trial chamber to turn down
an Afghanistan investigation—it took the shape of a landslide that
threatens the credibility of the Rome Statute system. Without swift
action - but more importantly effective and principled action - to shore
up the court’s foundations, serious questions about its ability to fully
deliver on its mandate will remain.
This piece highlights some of the additional developments of the
past months that have heightened concerns about the ICC. It then
analyzes the need for the ICC in today’s world and the challenges that

charges against the two remaining defendants, including Kenya’s deputy
president, William Ruto, following what the judges termed a systematic
effort to corrupt witnesses. Id. In the second Kenya case, the pre-trial
chamber similarly did not confirm charges against one defendant, while
the prosecution subsequently withdrew charges against the two remaining
defendants, including Kenya’s president, Uhuru Kenyatta, for lack of
evidence. Id. In that case, the court found the government was in breach
of its cooperation obligations. Id. Other cases have been closed, either
because of the death of the defendant or following a successful
admissibility challenge. Id.
9.

Kenneth Roth, Africa Attacks the International Criminal Court, THE
OF
BOOKS
(Feb.
6,
2014),
N.Y.
REVIEW
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2014/02/06/africa-attacksinternational-criminal-court/ [https://perma.cc/N67Z-VAZC].

10.

See, e.g., Elizabeth Evenson, Breaking the Rules: Kenya, the ICC, and
the Twelfth Assembly of States Parties Session, in GLOBALIZATION AND
ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 437–59 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2015).

11.

See Defendants at Large, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://www.icccpi.int/defendants?k=At%20large [https://perma.cc/694G-B6UM].

435

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 52 (2020)
Too Few Trials, Too Many Tribulations

have prevented the court from more fully delivering on its mandate. It
concludes with recommendations on the way forward.

The ICC’s Terrible Year
A few months after the Bemba decision, the U.S. government went
on the offensive against the court. 12 It saddled the institution and its
states parties with another political challenge to the court’s
legitimacy. 13 In a September 2018 speech in Washington, D.C., thenU.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton resumed his role as the
ICC’s chief opponent, announcing the US would break ties with the
court and threatening to sanction ICC staff and member countries
should ICC investigations touch U.S. nationals or U.S. allies. 14 The
context was the ICC prosecutor’s then-pending request for an
investigation in Afghanistan, 15 an investigation that might have
included conduct by U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and military
personnel, and the prosecutor’s preliminary inquiry into the situation
in Palestine. Bolton’s remarks were confirmed by U.S. President Donald
Trump from the UN General Assembly podium, 16 and in March 2019,
the U.S. acted on those threats, ultimately revoking the prosecutor’s
visa to the United States. 17
In January 2019, a trial chamber acquitted, by a majority, the
former president of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, and a co-defendant,
without requiring the defense to mount a case. 18 This was played out

12.

Elizabeth Evenson, US Takes Aim at the International Criminal Court,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Sept.
11,
2018),
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/09/11/us-takes-aim-internationalcriminal-court [https://perma.cc/3RQ6-YZUS].

13.

See id.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.

Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President
Trump to the 73rd Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Sept.
25, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-president-trump-73rd-session-united-nationsgeneral-assembly-new-york-ny/).

17.

US Threatens International Criminal Court, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(March 15, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/15/us-threatensinternational-criminal-court
[https://perma.cc/D23D-5VFZ];
Mike
Corder, US Revokes Visa for International Court Prosecutor Bensouda,
PRESS
(Apr.
5,
2019),
ASSOCIATED
https://www.apnews.com/a5e0748b9b7443e683c6a0f4e0c7d509
[https://perma.cc/5967-U4Z7].

18.

Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Trial Chamber I
Acquits Laurent Gbagbo and Charles Blé Goudé from All Charges (Jan.
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in the context of a situation in which the prosecution’s failure to bring
cases against those supportive of President Alassane Ouattara, who
allegedly committed grave crimes, had already polarized opinion about
the court domestically. 19 The judges did not issue detailed written
reasons simultaneously with the acquittal, and a written judgement was
only filed in July. 20 This challenged court efforts to explain the decision
to Ivorians. The prosecution is likely still to appeal.
Other developments—including a lawsuit by a small number of the
court’s judges before the International Labour Organization seeking a
pay rise, 21 after states parties failed to take decisive action on the
request, and the decision of the Japanese government to appoint one of
the court’s judges as its ambassador to Estonia while she was still
serving on a trial chamber 22 (she later resigned the ambassadorship)—
brought unflattering attention to the court’s bench. 23
In some respects, these developments still did not feel like they
marked some particularly new or different moment. As serious as they
were, most of all for the individual victims looking to the court for
redress, problems in investigations and too-little attention to the court’s
real world impact were not new, and had been the focus of advocacy
and attention for some time. 24 What felt new, perhaps, was that the
15,
2019),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1427
[https://perma.cc/PU4R-KRPE].
19.

Making Justice Count: Lessons from the ICC’s Work in Cote d’Ivoire,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Aug.
4,
HUMAN
2015), https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/08/04/making-justicecount/lessons-iccs-work-cote-divoire [https://perma.cc/HC52-7GPA].

20.

See ICC Prosecutors to Appeal Acquittal of Former Ivory Coast President
24
(Sept.
16,
2018),
Laurent
Gbagbo,
FRANCE
https://www.france24.com/en/20190916-icc-prosecutors-appealacquittal-former-ivory-coast-president-laurent-gbagbo
[https://perma.cc/8JT4-PTBX].

21.

Marlise Simons, In The Hague’s Lofty Judicial Halls, Judges Wrangle
(Jan.
20,
2019),
Over
Pay,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/20/world/europe/hague-judgespay.html [https://perma.cc/DT3V-KTCU].

22.

Kevin Jon Heller, Ntaganda Defence Reacts to the Judge Ozaki
JURIS
(Jan.
4,
2019),
Revelations,
OPINIO
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/04/01/ntaganda-defence-reacts-to-the-judgeozaki-revelations/ [https://perma.cc/QB49-CNGX].

23.

See Simons, supra note 22; ICC: Congo Warlord Guilty of Crimes Against
RIGHTS
WATCH
(July
8,
2019),
Humanity,
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/08/icc-congo-warlord-guilty-crimesagainst-humanity [https://perma.cc/CS3U-9UNL] (noting that Ntaganda
filed a request to disqualify the judge, but the request was ultimately
rejected by a plenary of judges).

24.

For example, the NGO Coalition for the ICC has an outreach and
communications team that has repeatedly stressed the importance of
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margin of error was shrinking as the court’s stature brought increased
scrutiny. Still, even Bolton’s noxious offensive was charged with a silver
lining of revitalizing state party support to rally against external
threats by a discreditable U.S. administration. 25 The end of 2018 also
saw arrests in the court’s first cases in its second Central African
Republic investigation, which is focused on the conflict there since
2012. 26
But in April, a pre-trial chamber rejected the prosecution’s request
to open an investigation in Afghanistan. 27 Judges found that the
strengthened
engagement
with
affected
communities.
See
Communications and Outreach, COALITION FOR THE INT’L CRIMINAL CT.,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/communications-and-outreach
[https://perma.cc/367Y-CZRH]. The Victims’ Rights Working Group,
also created through the Coalition for the ICC, has addressed the
constellation of issues surrounding effective victim participation and
representation before the court, including the delivery of reparations. See
RIGHTS
WORKING
GROUP,
Who
We
Are,
VICTIMS’
http://www.vrwg.org/about-vrwg/who-we-are [https://perma.cc/6J9DPDPK]. See also Elizabeth Evenson, Making Justice Count: Lessons from
the ICC’s Work in Cote d’Ivoire, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 4, 2015),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/08/04/making-justice-count/lessonsiccs-work-cote-divoire
[https://perma.cc/3JCG-B4GW];
Unfinished
Business: Closing Gaps in the Selection of ICC Cases, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH
(Sept.
15,
2011),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2011/09/15/unfinished-business/closinggaps-selection-icc-cases [perma.cc/H86Q-QPPN]; Impunity Restored?
Lessons learned from the failure of the Kenyan cases at the International
Criminal Court, KENYANS FOR PEACE WITH TRUTH AND JUSTICE (Nov. 23,
2016),
https://kptj.or.ke/impunity-restored-lessons-learned-from-thefailure-of-the-kenyan-cases-at-the-international-criminal-court/
[https://perma.cc/WN77-DRJB]; AM. UNIV. WASH. COLL. OF L. WAR
CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, INVESTIGATIVE MANAGEMENT, STRATEGIES,
AND TECHNOLOGIES OF THE INT’L CRIMINAL COURT’S OFFICE OF THE
PROSECUTOR (2012), https://www.wcl.american.edu/impact/initiativesprograms/warcrimes/our-projects/icc-legal-analysis-and-educationproject/reports/report-16-investigative-management-strategies-andtechniques-of-the-international-criminal-courts-office-of-the-prosecutor/
[https://perma.cc/WCT7-HH4Y].
25.

Adam Taylor, John Bolton Hates the International Criminal Court. That
Might Make Other Countries Love It, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/09/10/john-bolton-hatesinternational-criminal-court-that-might-make-other-countries-love-it/
[https://perma.cc/397E-UQEU].

26.

Elise Keppler, Justice Moves Ahead in the Central African Republic,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Dec.
12,
2018),
HUMAN
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/12/13/justice-moves-ahead-centralafrican-republic [https://perma.cc/DT8W-MSJB].

27.

Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17, Decision
Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an
Investigation into the Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ¶
96 (Apr. 12, 2019).
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prosecution had satisfied its burden as to the existence of crimes within
the court’s jurisdiction and the absence of national proceedings that
would cut off its mandate. 28 They nonetheless found that an
investigation would not be in “the interests of justice,” a term of art in
the Rome Statute, because the cooperation challenges—likely a nod to
the Trump administration’s threats, as well as political developments
in Afghanistan—were so steep as to limit the likelihood of successful
prosecution. 29 The prosecution, they concluded, should invest its scarce
resources elsewhere. 30
This was shocking. Shocking in what gave rise to the appearance of
capitulation to external pressure, most of all, but also in the eating
away of the court’s mandate were the decision followed to its logical
conclusion across the court’s work. The very nature of that work
requires the court to confront powerful interests opposed to
accountability. Cooperation is also dynamic and subject to influence—
as changes in domestic politics and the pressure applied by the United
States and the European Union shows in the context of cooperation
with the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. 31 Requiring guarantees of
cooperation from the outset renders the ICC’s investigations a null set.32
Of course, the decision did not bar the court’s doors. In fact, appeals
proceedings have been launched with regard to the Afghanistan
decision. Work goes on—including a fresh request from the prosecution
to investigate crimes connected to the forced displacement of the
Rohingya from Myanmar into Bangladesh. 33 Work goes on at ICC
headquarters and in its country offices, in the scrum of diplomats in
The Hague and in New York charged with following ICC matters, and
in civil society organizations globally who speak out against abuses,
support victims, and catalyze government support for justice. But the
court is facing very significant questions as to whether it will be allowed
(politically) and whether it is capable (in its own practices, policies,
and legal framework) of delivering on its founders’ ambitions twenty
years ago in Rome Addressing these questions in a manner that pushes
28.

Id.

29.

Id. ¶ 95.

30.

Id.

31.

VICTOR PESKIN, INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN RWANDA AND THE BALKANS:
VIRTUAL TRIALS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR STATE COOPERATION 65 (2008).

32.

See Param-Preet Singh, In Afghanistan, the ICC Abandons the Field,
RIGHTS
WATCH
(April
23,
2019),
HUMAN
https://www.openglobalrights.org/In-afghanistan-the-ICC-abandons-thefield/ [https://perma.cc/XFB4-KMHL].

33.

Param-Preet Singh, ICC Prosecutor Seeking to Investigate Crimes
Against Rohingya, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 26, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/06/26/icc-prosecutor-seekinginvestigate-crimes-against-rohingya [https://perma.cc/3XKT-R42V].
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the ICC forward—rather than scales back on those ambitions—is the
essential task now.

Is the ICC Worth Saving?
The ICC’s founding treaty, the Rome Statute, was adopted in
1998. 34 This was on the back of horrific atrocities, including genocides
in Rwanda and Bosnia. 35 Individual tribunals had been set up by the
UN to address these situations. 36 This gave new impetus to longstanding ambition to create a permanent court with a mandate over
the world’s worst crimes. 37 A permanent, international court to enforce
the global rule of law by prosecuting these crimes—and doing so
impartially, not as a matter of victor’s justice— would help to turn the
page on the 20th century’s history of rampant crimes committed with
impunity. 38
Built into the Rome Statute system was the ambition to bring
together its global reach with its local application.
Global reach because although the court is treaty based, meaning
its widest application is within states parties, through the UN Security
Council and through ad hoc acceptance of the court’s jurisdiction by
states, its reach could be potentially universal. 39 This, along with the
absence of immunities within the statute, meant that the court could
in theory act to ensure that no one was above the law, no matter how
powerful they or their allies might be. 40 This year, against the backdrop
of considerable controversy and problems in state party compliance in
34.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, in force on July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

35.

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview, UNITED
NATIONS,
http://legal.un.org/icc/general/overview.htm
[https://perma.cc/5NQX-CRVU].

36.

UN Documentation: International Law, DAG HAMMARSKJOLD LIBRARY
(May
2,
2019),
https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts
[https://perma.cc/P4RZ-VW7E].

37.

INT’L CRIMINAL CT., UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT
1,
https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7UK-MHZ2].

38.

See Richard Dicker and Amy Braunschweiger, Interview: The Future of
International Justice Amid Boundless Cruelty, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
(July 11, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/07/11/interviewfuture-international-justice-amid-boundless-cruelty
[https://perma.cc/8SGA-LG2Q].

39.

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 37, art.
12–13.

40.

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 37, art.
27.
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the arrest of former Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, ICC appeals
judges confirmed that there is no head-of-state immunity for sitting
leaders before the court where it otherwise has jurisdiction. 41
Alongside a global reach for the court itself, local application of
international criminal law was built into the treaty. 42 The Rome Statute
sets up the ICC as a court of last resort—it can only intervene where
national authorities cannot or do not act to prosecute these crimes.43 It
sets in place the ICC as a court, but also a broader Rome Statute
system for justice rooted in the national law and courts of ICC states
parties. 44
In spite of the sizeable efforts to put in place this innovative and
sui generis court—which also has strong provisions in its treaty on
sexual and gender-based crimes and victims’ rights—many thought at
the time that it might not actually be needed, that the horrors of the
20th century would not be repeated.
Unfortunately, the ICC as a court remains as relevant today, if not
more so, given the ongoing commission of Rome Statute crimes. The
Rome Statute has been an engine of important law reform where the
treaty has been implemented in national law, which could one day
increase the local application of its law. 45 But in many places, the
technical capacity, and perhaps more importantly, political will to
support independent, impartial investigations of serious international
crimes remains lacking. 46 Support is available to national prosecutions
of international crimes, but some mechanisms set up in recent years like the EU toolkit on complementarity and an Assembly of States
Parties platform to facilitate this assistance - have not been fully
utilized. 47 While there are some alternatives to ICC action, so far, these
are simply too few.
41.

See ICC: Jordan Was Required to Arrest Sudan’s Bashir, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (May 6, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/06/iccjordan-was-required-arrest-sudans-bashir
[https://perma.cc/T8JQGHPP].

42.

See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 37, art.
17.

43.

Id.

44.

See id.

45.

See Implementing Legislation on the Rome Statute, PARLIAMENTARIANS
FOR
GLOBAL
ACTION,
https://www.pgaction.org/ilhr/romestatute/implementing-legislation.html [https://perma.cc/EE4T-C67K].

46.

See Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice, HUMAN
RIGHTS
WATCH
(May
3,
2018),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/03/pressure-point-iccs-impactnational-justice/lessons-colombia-georgia-guinea-and
[https://perma.cc/RMK2-8NER].

47.

High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy and European Commission, Joint Staff Working
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Challenges in Practice
If the need for the ICC as a particularly important vehicle for
accountability remains, the challenges in practice have been enough to
question whether the court can ever work as intended.
That is not to say that the Rome Statute project is not without
successes. The ICC’s existence is exerting a powerful normative force.
For example, the quest for justice for the situation in Syria was blocked
by political divides within the UN Security Council on an ICC referral.48
But it was then channeled into the creation, by the UN General
Assembly, of an innovative investigative mechanism to prepare case
files for future prosecutions. 49 The engagement of the ICC prosecution
with national authorities can be a plus-factor for justice, as in Guinea
and to a lesser extent Colombia, although practice needs to be
strengthened and better supported by other partners to realize greater
effects. 50
But in its own investigations and prosecutions, as a court engaged
in a diverse range of countries, the ICC has underperformed. There have
been lengthy court proceedings; divergent approaches by chambers on
key issues; challenges in selecting cases and getting cases the
prosecution brings to trial, and once at trial, in securing convictions;
Document on Advancing the Principle of Complementarity: Toolkit for
Bridging the Gap Between International and National Justice, SWD, at
26
(Jan.
31,
2013),
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/joint-staff-workingdocument-on-advancing-the-principle-ofcomplementarity2013_en_12.pdf; Complementarity and the International Criminal Court:
Platform for Technical Assistance, INT’L CRIMINAL CT., https://asp.icccpi.int/en_menus/asp/complementarity/Documents/ICC%20compleme
ntarity%20template%20platform%20EN.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
48.

Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to ICC, BBC NEWS (May
22,
2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27514256
[https://perma.cc/Y925-DFHP].

49.

Syria: UN General Assembly Adopts Resolution on War Crimes
RIGHTS
WATCH
(Dec.
21,
2016),
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questions on defense and victims’ rights, including the development of
legal aid policies; and a shallow footprint in countries where
investigation take place. Together these limit the ICC’s impact. 51 As
noted above, these issues are not new, but they have come thundering
to the forefront over the past year.
A turbulent landscape on which the ICC works has sharpened
attention to the court’s missteps.
This is not 1998. There is a broader retreat underway from the
global rule of law. As noted above, the U.S. has returned to the hostile
approach it took during the ICC’s earliest years. The most immediate
context for U.S. action was the potential Afghanistan investigation that
could have touched on U.S. conduct there. 52 But the U.S. has made
clear that it might also act to undermine other potential ICC
investigations. 53 The Philippines and Burundi withdrew from the court
when faced with potential investigations, 54 while the Russian
government “unsigned” the ICC treaty as the prosecution reported on
progress in its preliminary inquiry of the situation in Ukraine. 55
The reasons for the court’s underperformance need to be better
understood.
Some factors are within the control of the court itself—mistakes
made in the policies and practices of ICC officials. 56 These include poor
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choices in early investigative methodologies and strategies, now
acknowledged by the Office of the Prosecutor. 57
Other factors have to do with the role of ICC states parties. The
court relies to a very significant degree on cooperation and other
support by states—in arrests, in investigations, in addressing witness
and victim protection and witness interference, and in meeting defense
rights. 58 It also relies on states to elect its officials and provide sufficient
funding. 59 There have been gaps (and at times, obstruction) in each of
these areas. 60 Years of demand by some states parties—including
Colombia, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, in varying degrees(to hold down increases in the court’s
budget, sometimes couched as a call for “zero nominal growth”)—have
deprived the court of the resources it needs to deepen its impact. 61
It was thought that a permanent court would have several
advantages, including the ability to act more quickly during ongoing
conflict. 62 But in fact, when it comes to political support, its
permanence has largely operated to its detriment. While creating a new
57.
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tribunal would be a heavy political and financial lift, something not so
dissimilar turns out to be required for each new ICC situation.
Additional budgetary allocations, but also building anew the political
consensus and support for the ICC to act, and specific networks for
practical assistance in investigations, for the defense, to support
outreach and victims, tailored to each country’situation are needed.
Security Council and state party referrals have hardly proven to be the
guarantor of cooperation on the sustained basis required for success.
States parties remain engaged on the ICC. This includes dedicated
focal points in some ministries and embassy staff in The Hague. 63 There
have been significant policy initiatives to address cooperation. 64 But the
court’s permanence can facilitate a fatigue in which the ICC lacks
sustained attention to its sizeable and enduring cooperation needs dayin and day-out, as well as the creativity to rethink and adapt to new
situations.
Beyond state party cooperation, the court’s permanence in an era
in which Rome Statute crimes are being committed in far too many
places around the globe has also gradually brought on an even more
profound challenge.
The court has eleven open situations under investigation and is
seeking investigations in Bangladesh/Myanmar and, depending on the
outcome of appeal proceedings, Afghanistan. 65 There are several other
preliminary examinations pending which may satisfy the Rome Statute
criteria for investigation. 66 As the prosecutor’s current strategic plan
63.
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acknowledges, “stakeholders expect the Office [of the Prosecutor] to
deliver more and better results, preferably within a shorter time and
some expect this to be accomplished within the bounds of existing or
with even fewer resources,” and, on the other hand, “in the coming
years, the Office expects to face an increase in the number of situations
under investigation as its ongoing preliminary examinations progress,
while resources are unlikely to significantly increase.” 67
As we have noted elsewhere, this is a critical challenge with few
easy answers. 68
This leaves the court at a crossroads. In one direction, the court is
needed to do more than ever, and, at least prior to the decision on
Afghanistan, it was on the verge of showing its power as a court and a
system to take on situations thought to be beyond the reach of justice.69
In the other, the ICC is facing credible questions as to whether it and
its states parties are up-to-the task, especially in difficult political times.
Can the court better succeed or will these challenges result in efforts to
curtail the court’s founding ambitions, undercutting victims’ access to
justice and rolling back on the international community’s commitment
to the fight against impunity?

Where to Go from Here
States parties—particularly following a speech by the United
Kingdom at the 2018 annual meeting of ICC states parties 70— are
seized of the court’s challenges and have set in motion a review
process. 71 The scope and modalities for this review process remain to be
67.
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identified, but there are certainly real opportunities to address
challenges—including a review of nomination and election procedures
for judges and a thorough, merit-based, search for the court’s next
prosecutor, to be elected in 2020. 72
There is a genuineness to state party concern and participation in
discussions around this review process. Certainly, that commitment and
attention is to be welcomed, particularly where it has overlapped with
efforts by states to lead on responding to the political challenges of the
day, like the US’s threats, through joint statements and Assembly
resolutions. 73
But states’ agendas are many. The United Kingdom has been clear
in its demands for “timelines” and “closure strategies” to the
prosecutor’s “cases,” including its preliminary examinations. 74
Attention to the prosecutor’s preliminary examination practice and the
need, on a court-wide basis, to consider when and how to wind-down
work in situations under investigation to enhance the court’s legacy are
important. Yet one of the prosecutor’s preliminary examinations
concerns allegations of abuse in Iraq by UK forces that national courts
have thus far failed to prosecute. 75 Demands for budgetary limits have
been justified in the past by trumping up the court’s purported
inefficiencies in its use of resources, for example, at one point, the

ASP-18-Bureau-7.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PHH-98PZ] (describing the
development of a “matrix” of issues for further discussion and, subsequent
to the meeting, the Bureau’s approval of preliminary work by the
Assembly president regarding an independent expert review of the
court).
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position of some states parties that court outreach programs to affected
communities were not within the court’s core mandate. 76
There needs to be real attention paid to any signs that the review
process will be used as a Trojan horse with which to impede judicial
and prosecutorial independence, rather than to undertake changes
necessary to strengthen the court. What is challenging, however, is that
a vision for some of “strengthening” the court could include, as the pretrial chamber’s Afghanistan decision seems to suggest, cutting back on
the full ambitions of the Rome Statute in light of the challenges the
project has faced to date. 77
But a court without those ambitions would not be one worth
having. To mitigate these risks, any review process of the court’s work
should be anchored in an assessment first by an independent group of
experts. These experts should be independent of the court and of states
parties. They should be career professionals with demonstrated
expertise in investigating, prosecuting, defending, and adjudicating
complex criminal offenses, as well as managing bodies comparable to
the ICC’s organs. They could assess court practice and recommend
changes. While the experts themselves, once appointed and in
consultation with the court, states parties, and civil society, should set
the specific terms of references themselves, their assessment should be
aimed at how the court’s mandate can be better implemented in
practice, for example, through strengthened investigations and
improved management of judicial proceedings, rather than revisiting
the court’s purpose or mission. Similar assessments have been carried
out for the ad hoc tribunals and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. 78
76.
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To be sure, alongside an independent expert panel, the court on its
own can continue to learn lessons from its practice and implement
changes. States parties can similarly examine their own practices and
start to work on issues that require more urgent action (for example,
strengthening the procedures for the nomination and election of judges).
But these “internal” and ad hoc change processes appear insufficient in
light of the challenges that the past year displayed. Meanwhile, by
memorializing these findings and recommendations in a public report,
and addressing the court’s work holistically, the independent expert
panel’s work would serve as a common and credible reference point.
This is currently lacking in discussions about review and reform. An
independent expert panel would help ensure the right kind of change to
support, rather than erode, the determination of Rome that “the most
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
must not go unpunished.” 79
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